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Abstract 
 
The article deals with the main problems 
associated with the possibility of implementing a 
constitutional alternative in Russia in the XIX 
century. The authors consider the prerequisites 
for the development of constitutional projects 
during this period, including their regularity or 
randomness, and relationship with previous 
stages of development of the Russian statehood. 
They pay particular attention to the subjective 
factor, i.e. personal views and worldview of the 
Russian emperors as the main condition for the 
implementation of the constitutional alternative 
to the development of the country. The reigns of 
Alexander I and Alexander II, who were either 
the initiators of the development of constitutional 
projects (Alexander I) or did not prevent it 
(Alexander II), are the focus of attention. The 
comparative analysis of the main constitutional 
projects of the XIX century is carried out in this 
article: of the Letter of Commendation to the 
Russian people in 1801, the project of M.M. 
Speransky in 1809, the Charter Diploma of the 
Russian Empire in 1818-1820, the project of P.A. 
Valuev in 1863, the grand prince Konstantin 
Nikolaevich in 1866 and 1880, the P.A. Shuvalov 
in 1874 and of the M.T. Loris-Melikov in 1880-
1881.The projects of the time period of 
Alexander II are much more moderate than of the 
epoch of Alexander I and they can be recognized 
as constitutional ones with a great stretch. It was 
a step backwards in the development of Russian 
  Аннотация 
 
В статье рассматривается основной круг 
проблем, связанных с возможностью 
реализации конституционной альтернативы в 
России в XIX веке.  Авторы рассматривают 
предпосылки разработки конституционных 
проектов на протяжении XIX столетия, 
включая вопрос об их закономерности или 
случайности, связи с предшествующими 
этапами развития российской 
государственности. Особое внимание 
уделяется субъективному фактору, т.е. 
личным взглядам и мировоззрению 
российских императоров как главному 
условию реализации конституционной 
альтернативы развития страны. 
Соответственно в центре внимания 
оказываются правления Александра I и 
Александра II, которые по своим взглядам 
были либо инициаторами разработки 
конституционных проектов (Александра I), 
либо не препятствовали этому (Александр II). 
Проводится сравнительный анализ основных 
конституционных проектов XIX века: 
Жалованной Грамоты Российскому народу 
1801 г., проекта М.М. Сперанского 1809 г., 
Уставной Грамоты Российской империи  
1818-1820 гг., проекта П.А. Валуева 1863 г., 
вел. кн. Константина Николаевича 1866 и 
1880 г., П.А. Шувалова 1874 г. и М.Т. Лорис-
Меликова 1880-1881 г. Обращается внимание 
на то, что проекты эпохи Александра II 
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constitutionalism. This is explained by a 
subjective factor: much more moderate political 
views of Alexander II and his greater 
commitment to the autocratic tradition inherited 
from his father. In conclusion, there are the 
reasons for the lack of implementation of the 
constitutional alternative in Russia in the XIX 
century in this article, they are the following: 
peculiarities of the social structure of the Russian 
society, narrowness of the social base of the 
constitutional reforms, lack of understanding and 
disinterestedness of the majority of the 
population in their implementation and necessity, 
indecision of the emperors. 
 
Keywords: Constitutional monarchy, 
constitutional projects, constitutionalism, history 
of Russia in the XIX century, political reforms. 
гораздо умереннее проектов эпохи 
Александра I и конституционными их можно 
назвать с большой натяжкой. По сути, это 
был шаг назад в развитии российского 
конституционализма. Объясняется это 
субъективным фактором – намного более 
умеренными политическими взглядами 
Александра II, его большей 
приверженностью самодержавной традиции, 
унаследованной от отца. В заключение 
исследуются причины нереализованности 
конституционной альтернативы в России в 
XIX в.: особенности социальной структуры 
российского общества, узость социальной 
базы конституционных реформ, непонимание 
и незаинтересованность большинства 
населения в их проведении и в их 
необходимости,  нерешительность 
императоров. 
 
Ключевые слова: история России XIX века, 
конституционализм, конституционная 
монархия, конституционные проекты, 
политические реформы. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The XIX century is the period of the final 
transition of European civilization to the 
industrial-capitalist stage of development. A 
characteristic feature of the functioning of the 
political sphere of public life was the increase of 
civil and political activity of the population and, 
as a consequence, tendency of transition to the 
constitutional forms of government 
(constitutional monarchy or republic). This trend 
was formed during the French Revolution and 
Napoleonic wars, and finally became dominant 
after other revolutions in Europe in 1848-1849, 
when the majority of European states obtained 
constitutions. Russia should have developed in 
the same direction, because in the period of Peter 
the Great a choice (at least formally) to borrow 
the achievements of Western European 
civilization was made. However, the Russian 
Empire remained an absolute (autocratic) 
monarchy throughout the XIX century. The 
purpose of this article is to analyze the factors 
that prevented the introduction of the 
constitutional order in the country, although 
these attempts were repeatedly made, and quite 
actively, during the reign of Alexander I (project 
of the Letter of Commendation to the Russian 
people in 1801, project of M.M. Speransky in 
1809, project of the Charter Diploma of the 
Russian Empire in 1818-1820 of N.N. 
Novosiltsev, Decembrist constitutional projects), 
and less actively during the reign of Alexander II  
 
 
(project of P.A. Valuyev in 1863, projects of 
grand prince Konstantin Nikolaevich in 1866 and 
1880, project of M.T. Loris-Melikov in 1880-
1881). 
 
Theoretical basis 
 
There are the following basic concepts used in 
the study: state, monarchy, constitutional 
monarchy, constitutional projects, and reasons 
for the unrealized constitutional alternative in 
Russia in the XIX century. 
 
Methodology 
 
The authors in the article use, first of all, logical 
methods of research: analysis, synthesis, 
comparison; method of modeling (building a 
theoretical model of the new political system of 
Russia in the case of the implementation of one 
of the constitutional projects); private scientific 
methods of historical research: historical and 
genetic (when analyzing the reasons for the non-
implementation of constitutional projects), 
historical and comparative (when comparing the 
constitutional projects during the reign of 
Alexander I and Alexander II), historical and 
typological (to find out what type of 
constitutionalism the projects can be attributed 
to). Also, the method of structural and functional 
analysis was used in the work (for example, when 
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analyzing the correlation of powers of different 
branches of authority on the constitutional 
projects). 
 
Results 
 
As a result of the research the authors made the 
conclusion that the transformation of the Russian 
Empire into a constitutional monarchy was 
hindered by a combination of objective and 
subjective reasons. Among the first reasons there 
were the following: general lag of political and 
socio-economic development of Russia from the 
countries of Western Europe; specific social 
structure of the Russian society with almost 
complete dominance of the nobility; the need to 
simultaneously solve the problem of political and 
social reforms, which made the situation more 
difficult; narrowness of the social base of 
supporters of constitutional reforms. The second 
one is Alexander I's lack of determination, his 
tendency to hesitate, uncertainty about the 
correctness of the chosen path, as well as his 
unwillingness to give up the prerogatives of 
absolute power in Alexander II. 
 
Discussion 
 
The Russian Empire entered the XIX century as 
a militarily powerful country with an absolutist 
despotic form of government and a complete 
predominance of feudal-serfdom relations in the 
socio-economic sphere of public life. At the same 
time, the majority of modern historians believe 
that by this time the potential of Peter the Great's 
model of modernization had been almost 
completely exhausted. It is clear that it was 
impossible to use his legacy indefinitely. 
Moreover, his modernization was one-sided and 
incomplete, reduced mainly to the borrowing of 
military and administrative technologies and did 
not affect the political, legal and social spheres of 
public life. Partial renewals of Peter's military 
bureaucratic system, made by Catherine II, did 
not solve all the problems. Moreover, the 
countries of Western Europe have moved to the 
industrial-capitalist stage of development, the 
pace of economic growth has accelerated 
significantly. In the Russian economy, however, 
the feudal-serfdom system, which was finally 
formed under Peter the Great and was based on 
strict non-economic coercion, dominated the 
entire economy. Without material incentives, at 
the total disenfranchisement of the 
overwhelming majority of the population, this 
system knowingly doomed the country to 
stagnation, slow economic development and loss 
of competition with the more developed 
countries of the West. Then, it also threatened to 
lose the status of a great power. The most 
educated and far-sighted representatives of the 
ruling circles, including the new Russian 
emperor Alexander I, understood that serious 
reforms were needed. The question was “how 
and in which direction”? The answers (may be 
strange) were given by the French Revolution. It 
showed with unprecedented clarity what can 
happen in case of delay with reforms. Any 
monarchical regime, including the Russian one, 
became clear: to prevent the repetition of these 
events in their country, it is necessary to 
eliminate the remnants of feudalism and move to 
a constitutional form of government. And both 
were made by reforms "from above", but under 
one condition: the presence of political will and 
desire to carry out these reforms in the ruling 
monarch. For Russia, it was especially important. 
The autocratic monarchy, which was finally 
formed under Peter the Great, was distinguished 
by obvious despotic tendencies and 
unprecedented concentration of power in the 
hands of the monarch (“leaving the question” of 
the real possibility to use it). Under these 
conditions, the subjective factors, i.e. monarch's 
personal qualities, political ideal, and outlook, 
are very important. For Alexander I, this factor 
was extremely favorable for constitutional 
reforms. Under the influence of his mentor, F. 
Lagarpa, the young emperor was receptive to the 
progressive ideas of the doctrine of 
enlightenment, and, unlike Catherine II, intended 
to implement them seriously. The basis of his 
outlook was a negative attitude towards serfdom, 
which was seen as a shameful phenomenon and 
a brake on the normal development of the 
country, as well as the idea of the rule of law, 
which resulted in the desire to clearly define the 
legal status of the entire Russian people and 
radically change the system of governance of the 
country on the basis of the principle of separation 
of powers, i.e., to introduce the constitution. 
Moreover, young Alexander, according to his 
friend and member of the Private Committee, 
prince A. Chartorizhskiy, considered, that the 
best form of government is republic 
(Chartorizhskiy, 1912). 
 
Due to the subjective factor, i.e. personal views 
and peculiarities of Alexander I's education and 
worldview that at the beginning of the XIX 
century there appeared a real possibility of 
adoption of the constitution in Russia. At the 
same time, Alexander I could not help but 
understand that since the leading countries of the 
world (England, United States, and France) the 
constitutions had adopted and were 
implementing, the same thing would happen in 
less developed countries, including Russia. 
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Сonstitutional order is the future, moreover, the 
political history of Russia was not only the 
implementation and development of the 
absolutist-despotic tendency, but also there was a 
different, restrictive trend since ancient times. 
We can remember the active role of the people's 
assemblies in the Old Russian State, activity of 
Zemsky (Land) Sobor in the XVI-XVII 
centuries, restrictive records on the accession to 
the throne of Vasily Shuisky, the Polish prince 
Vladislav and, quite possibly, Mikhail Romanov 
during the Time of Troubles, the condition of the 
Supreme Privy Council of 1730, the 
constitutional projects of сount N.I. Panin in the 
1770s-1780s. (Zakharov, 2017). So, the plans to 
introduce the сonstitution in Russia in the 
beginning of the XIX century were not only the 
borrowing from the West and did not appear for 
nothing. But all the restrictive projects of the 
XVIII century were drafted in a secret or semi-
transparent atmosphere at the level of private 
individuals, albeit endowed with power, but 
without the support of the monarch. A distinctive 
feature of the projects of the beginning of the 
XIX century was that they were created not only 
with the knowledge of the head of state, but also 
on his initiative. Therefore, in this case it is 
possible to speak with full right about the 
government constitutionalism as a clearly 
expressed internal political course (Minaeva, 
1982; Mironenko, 1989; Zakharov, 2011). 
 
During the reign of Alexander I, at least three 
constitutional drafts were prepared at his direct 
order: Letter of Commendation to the Russian 
people in 1801, project of M.M. Speransky in 
1809, Charter Diploma of the Russian Empire in 
1818-1820. The first of them was preparing for 
the solemn coronation of Alexander I in 
September 1801, it was a kind of Declaration of 
Human Rights and Freedoms and was considered 
as an introduction to the future constitution. The 
document was developed in July-August 1801 as 
the Letter of Commendation of the nobility and 
cities of 1785. The initial version of 20 articles 
was prepared by the ex-president of the 
Collegium of Commerce and the future 
chancellor of the Russian empire (from 1802) 
A.R. Vorontsov (with the possible participation 
of his friend A.N. Radishchev, the author of the 
famous work "Journey From Petersburg to 
Moscow ") and did not go beyond the typical 
feudal charter on the model of the English Magna 
Charta Libertum with the addition of provisions 
from the Habeas corpus act of 1679. Almost all 
the articles were devoted to the restoration of the 
rights of the nobility and only one article was 
devoted to the townspeople and peasants. 
However, after discussion in the Private 
Committee, the document became of a 
conventional nature (replacement of the word 
"landlord" by "owner" (Art. 9), proclamation of 
the protection of personal property of the entire 
population, not just the nobility (Art. 7), 
proclamation of certain rights and freedoms for 
all "Russian subjects" (Art. 8), etc.), which 
allows to reasonably consider it a prototype of 
the introduction of the future сonstitution, 
designed for the entire population of Russia, 
including the serfs (Minaeva, 1982; Zakharov, 
2002). However, because of some reasons, the 
Letter of Commendation was never published. 
 
In 1809, at the direct order of the emperor, his 
secretary, trustee and advisor M.M. Speransky 
prepared a full-fledged project of constitution, 
although in draft form without dividing it into 
chapters and articles, with the title "Introduction 
to the implementation of national laws". It was 
supposed to completely transform the system of 
public administration in the country on the basis 
of separation of powers. A four-level system of 
governance was being developed. The executive 
power remained entirely under the monarch. It 
was subordinate to the ministries, which replaced 
the collegiums in 1802, were subordinate to 
provincial, district and volost administrations. 
The supreme judicial authority was the Senate, 
provincial, district and municipal courts were 
subordinated to it. Legislative power was divided 
between the emperor and the people's 
representation, which consisted, in fact, of two 
chambers (although it was not directly 
mentioned): State Council and the State Duma. 
The emperor retained enormous legislative 
powers: exclusive right of legislative initiative. 
There were the rights of absolute veto and to 
dissolve the lower chamber, but with the 
obligatory appointment of new elections. 
However, it lost the right to adopt laws, and now 
the draft laws had to be discussed in the State 
Duma and the State Council. It was the limitation 
of imperial power. At the same time, the State 
Council had to be fully appointed by the emperor, 
and the State Duma had to be elected on the basis 
of high property value (Medushevsky, 2000). 
 
There is the new system of state power under the 
project of M.M. Speransky: 
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Figure 1. New system of state power 
 
 
M.M. Speransky, was sure about the successful 
implementation of his project, as he had prepared 
step-by-step instruction, at what time functioning 
of one or another authority under his project 
should start. It was supposed to adopt a law on 
the State Council on December 15, 1809, January 
1, 1810. State Council had to meet for the first 
time, by May 1810, it had to develop the 
regulations on the new structure of executive 
power, and by August it had to develop the 
Regulations on the new structure of legislative 
and judicial power. On August 15, the manifest 
on the election of deputies to the State Duma had 
to appear. Finally, on September 1, 1810 the first 
meeting of the State Duma was to be held. 
(Zakharov, 2017). However, only the creation of 
the State Council was implemented, but with a 
completely different powers than those provided 
for by the project of M.M. Speransky (law-
abiding). The main part of the project was not 
implemented, and M.M. Speransky was deprived 
of all his positions under the pressure of 
conservative noble circles and in March 1812 on 
the eve of the war with Napoleon was sent into 
exile in Perm. 
 
However, the development of constitutional 
projects did not stop there. After the Patriotic 
War of 1812 and the foreign campaigns of the 
Russian army (War of the Sixth Coalition), 
Alexander I returned to the development of 
constitutional reform. The positive effect of the 
"constitutional diplomacy” occurred in the 
Russian Empire in the Restoration period (1814-
1818), played an important role. It was the 
introduction of constitutions in the countries 
liberated from Napoleon, which was considered 
as a necessary concession to public opinion and 
a guarantee against new revolutions. It was at the 
initiative of Russia and Alexander I that the 
French Charter of 1814, the constitutions of 
Baden, Bavaria, Wurttemberg and other German 
states of 1815-1818 and the Constitution of the 
Kingdom of Poland of 1815 were adopted. We 
can also speak about Russia's active participation 
in the development of the constitutional order of 
the Ionian Islands in 1803 and Finland in 1809. 
In this regard, the Constitution of the Kingdom 
of Poland (territory of big part of the Duchy of 
Warsaw, annexed to the Russian Empire due to 
the decision of the Vienna Congress in 1815), 
which can be regarded as a trial step, experiment 
on the introduction of the constitutional order in 
other parts of the Russian Empire. At the same 
time, there was the following paradoxical 
situation: Alexander I was a constitutional 
monarch in Poland and Finland, and in the main 
part of the Russian Empire he remained an 
autocrat. Probably, he understood this 
contradiction. 
 
As a result, in 1818 on the instructions of the 
emperor the work on the Charter of the Russian 
empire began in Warsaw, according to which 
Emperor 
State Council 
Executive Legislature Judiciary 
Ministries 
Provincial 
directorates 
District 
directorates 
Volost directorates 
State Duma 
Provincial Dumas 
District Dumas 
Volost Dumas 
Senate 
Provincial 
courts 
District courts 
Volost courts 
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"legal and free institutions", as Alexander said, 
were to be extended to the entire territory of 
Russia. The same commission headed by the ex-
member of Private Committee, the N.N. 
Novosiltsev, was preparing this project till 1820. 
They also made the Constitution of the Kingdom 
of Poland. This Charter seemed like the Polish 
one and like the project of M.M. Speransky of 
1809. The difference between the last one was 
that it was fully prepared document meeting all 
the requirements for constitutions: clear structure 
and division of legislative material into chapters 
and articles. It contained 6 chapters and 191 
articles (the Constitution of the Kingdom of 
Poland had 7 chapters (titles) and 165 articles). 
As in the project of M.M. Speransky, there was 
the principle of separation of powers. The 
emperor retained all the executive power and 
considerable powers in the sphere of legislative 
one. Limitation of his power was only the 
impossibility to adopt laws alone (Mironenko, 
1989; Zakharov, 2011). As well as according to 
the project of M.M. Speransky, Russia had to 
become (using modern legal terminology) a 
constitutional dualistic monarchy. 
 
However, there were significant differences from 
the Speransky project. Firstly, Russia was 
divided into 12 viceroys, in which the structure 
of central authorities was copied (viceroy had the 
executive power, viceroy and the bicameral 
people's representation (local Seim) had the 
legislative power). Thus there was a 
decentralization of power, and Russia became a 
federation. Secondly, the role and functions of 
the Senate have changed: M.M. Speransky had 
the judicial power, the Charter was one of the 
chambers of the Legislative Seim (Article 136). 
The supreme judicial authority was the Supreme 
Court. Thirdly, the functions of the State Council 
divided into two chambers (primary development 
of draft laws, control over the ministers, and 
development and primary discussion of the 
budget (Articles 37-44)) were significantly 
expanded due to the reduction of the functions of 
the Legislative Seim (Medushevsky, 2000). 
According to the project of M.M. Speransky the 
State Council was to become the upper chamber 
of parliament, according to the Charter it was 
necessary to stay above all branches of power, 
acting as an intermediary between the emperor 
and the legislative, executive and judicial 
authorities. Finally, another difference was the 
more conservative electoral system. Elections to 
the lower chamber (House of Ambassadors) were 
to be held on the basis of a mixed property and 
class principle (M.M. Speransky's elections to 
the State Duma were to be held on the basis of a 
pure property census). In addition, the principle 
of the election of deputies was limited by the 
right of the emperor to select from the list of 
deputies 2/3 of their composition (Articles 102 
and 148). This rule was clearly aimed at cutting 
off undesirable candidates who did not suit the 
monarch (Medushevsky, 2000; Zakharov, 2017). 
 
There is the new political system in this figure:  
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. New political system 
Emperor 
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The Charter of the Russian Empire of 1818-1820 
was a fully elaborated constitutional document, 
prepared for publication, but its predecessors' 
fate was not realized. We are going to understand 
why it happened. But before that, it should be 
noted that at the turn of the XIX-XX centuries, 
there were two concepts that explained the failure 
of Alexander I's attempts to introduce the 
constitution in Russia in quite different ways. 
They can be defined as the concept of "flirting 
with liberalism" and the concept of "adapting to 
new socio-economic conditions". The first one 
was formulated for the first time in the works of 
pre-revolutionary historians N.K. Schilder and 
M.I. Bogdanovich and it dominated for a long 
time up to the 1980s in the Soviet historiography 
(the most prominent representatives of this 
concept are S.B. Okun, M.V. Nechkina and may 
be M.M. Safonov). Alexander I did not intend to 
carry out any serious reforms at all. All his liberal 
statements, including concerning the 
introduction of the constitution in Russia, were 
explained by the danger emanating from the 
dignity of the opposition, which sought to limit 
the autocratic power in its interests. Coming to 
power with their direct assistance, Alexander I 
was dependent on them and was forced, at least 
in words, to meet their demands. When the 
danger was over, he refused to implement liberal 
projects, moving on to a frankly reactionary 
policy, embodiment of which was the 
"arakcheevshchina" (system of military and 
police measures and reforms in the Russian 
Empire). All the statements about the 
introduction of the constitution in Russia were a 
simple deception and pretense, so all the projects 
of reforming the state system were initially 
doomed to failure (Schilder, 1904; Okun, 1956; 
Safonov, 1988). In fact, this concept (as applied 
to the Soviet historiography) was based on the 
extremely ideological thesis that the Russian 
autocracy was an extremely reactionary force 
and could not create anything progressive. 
 
According to the concept of "adaptation", 
Alexander I and his entourage in 1801-1820 tried 
to carry out serious political and social reforms 
to prevent a social explosion and adapt the 
Russian model of statehood to the new socio-
economic conditions, to make it actual. In pre-
revolutionary historiography, its supporters were 
A.N. Pypin, V.I. Semevsky, A.E. Presnyakov 
(Pypin, 1900; Presnyakov, 1924), in Soviet 
historiography there were A.V. Predtechensky 
(with reservations), S.V. Mironenko, A.N. 
Sakharov (Predtechensky, 1957; Mironenko, 
1989; Sakharov, 1998). N.V. Minaeva and A.N. 
Medushevsky took an intermediate position, but 
closer to the concept of "adaptation" (Minaeva, 
1982; Medushevsky, 1997). 
 
As we can see, the representatives of both 
concepts focus on the sincerity of the Emperor's 
intentions. In our view, "flirting with liberalism" 
is biased and contrary to the real facts. It is 
impossible to explain why Alexander I, apart 
from 1801, was not the only one who had a 
"flirting with liberalism". (Letter of 
Commendation to the Russian people in 1801), at 
least twice in 1809 (M.M. Speransky's project) 
and 1818-1820 Charter Diploma of the Russian 
Empire by N.N. Novosiltsev) returned to the idea 
of introducing the constitution in Russia and gave 
instructions to prepare corresponding projects. If 
in the first case it can still be explained by the 
pressure of the dignity of the opposition, in 1809 
and 1818 there was no serious opposition, most 
of the nobles were the apologists of autocracy, 
public opinion was underdeveloped, so 
Alexander I did not feel any pressure from this 
side. And all these projects were prepared under 
the direct order of him. In addition, the emperor's 
adherence to constitutional views is evidenced by 
his repeated statements in conversations with A. 
Chartorizhsky, in letters to V. Kochubey (for 
example, from May 10, 1796) and F. Lagarpu 
(for example, from October 27, 1797), and later 
in conversations with baron de Vitrol and 
Germaine de Staël in 1814, in letters to the Duke 
of Richelieu and the Russian envoy in Paris, 
Pozzo di Borgo (April 1816) (Kiseleva, 1995; 
Staël, 2003; Zakharov, 2017). Consequently, the 
emperor's intentions to introduce the constitution 
in the country can be considered quite sincere. 
 
But then the question about what are the real 
reasons for the failure to implement these 
constitutional projects and the constitutional 
alternative to the development of the country as 
a whole arised. 
 
In our opinion, the first place should be given to 
the peculiarities of socio-economic relations 
(serfdom) and social structure of the Russian 
society of that period (full political and property 
dominance of the nobility), which differed 
radically from the states of Western Europe. 
Taking into account the fact that Alexander I set 
the task of simultaneous political (introduction of 
the constitution) and social (gradual abolition of 
serfdom) transformations, the situation was 
really difficult, because one thing contradicted 
another one. The introduction of the constitution 
implied the creation of a parliament in which the 
majority, based on the peculiarities of the social 
structure of the Russian society of that period, 
would receive nobility with a pro-slavery 
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attitude. Alexander I had the opportunity to be 
convinced of this as early as on May 1801, when 
he tried to carry out a decree through the 
Permanent Council banning the sale of peasants 
without land and received a tough response. As a 
result, any draft law, at least at any way 
concerning the issue of serfdom, would have 
been inevitably blocked by the nobility majority. 
So, in the specific conditions of Russia, the huge 
good (constitution, people's representation) 
could cause great harm and preserve the serfdom. 
To this main reason the accompanying reasons 
were added. There was no broad social base for 
reforms. The main part of the nobility did not 
support the reform efforts of Alexander I 
(especially in the peasant issue). Even the 
bureaucratic elite, with rare exceptions, has not 
yet realized the need to give up part of the class 
privileges for the sake of national interests, as it 
happened before the "great reforms" of 
Alexander II. As a result, Alexander I was, in 
fact, alone, which predetermined the overall 
result of the planned reforms. 
 
In addition, the international situation did not 
contribute to the success of the reforms in the 
early XIX century. During the development of 
the project by M.M. Speransky, Russia was 
preparing for another war with Napoleon's 
France, and the temporary weakening of the 
central government was not appropriate. In 1820, 
when the emperor was almost ready to sign the 
Letter of Commendation, a new revolutionary 
wave (revolutions in Spain, Italy, etc.) began in 
Europe, which showed that moderate 
constitutions could not completely prevent the 
possibility of repetition of new revolutions. 
 
Finally, the subjective factor, i.e. the personal 
features of Alexander I, who was not a very 
determined and hesitant person, also played a 
role. And the more he thought about the 
consequences, the less he was sure of the 
correctness of the chosen course. As a result, 
none of the constitutional projects were 
implemented. 
 
The next chance to make Russia a constitutional 
monarchy or even a republic one could be 
presented in case of the Decembrist revolt 
victory. According to the projects of the Northern 
("Constitution" by N. Muravyov) and Southern 
("Russian' Justice" by P. Pestel) Societies it was 
supposed to publish the constitution. Specific 
questions about the future form of government 
and the form of state structure were to be 
resolved after the Russian Constituent Assembly 
was convened. In N. Muravyov's project the 
matter concerns the federal structure, which 
echoes the Letter of Commendation of 1818-
1820. (Mironenko, 1989). This thing can be 
explained by the fact that either N. Muravyov 
knew about the existence of it and he was 
familiar with its text, or thought in the same 
direction as its authors, including Alexander I. 
However, the emperor had moved to a 
conservative position and refused to carry out 
further reforms, the Decembrists considered the 
main obstacle to progress and prepared to 
overthrow it. In any case, they failed to seize 
power, and their plans to introduce a constitution 
were not implemented. 
 
During the long reign of Nicholas I (1825-1855), 
who held extremely conservative and protective 
views, there was no possibility of developing 
constitutional projects both "from above" and 
"from below". 
 
The situation changed with Alexander II (1855-
1881). In general, he held moderate liberal views, 
but unlike his uncle, Alexander I, he was not the 
initiator of reforms. In addition, in matters of 
reforming the political system, he was under the 
influence of his father and considered autocracy 
to be the best form of government for Russia. 
Most likely, that is why the "great reforms" 
affected all spheres of public life, except for the 
political one. Russia remained an absolute 
monarchy with his reign. 
 
Nevertheless, attempts to develop projects that at 
least remotely resemble constitutional ones were 
made from time to time. First of all, it is 
necessary to note the project of the Minister of 
Internal Affairs P.A. Valuyev "Establishment of 
the State Council" from November 1863 for the 
beginning of the implementation of the land 
reform. According to this project, it was planned 
to create a congress of state vowels under the 
state council (181 deputies). There were 101 
from provincial land, 32 from provinces where 
there were no land (Baltic States, Caucasus, 
Siberia, and Cossack lands), 18 from large cities, 
and 30 from the emperor. Deputies were elected 
for three years, as in the land, the session 
occurred once a year. There were law-abiding 
functions. The adopted decisions were 
transferred to the State Council with participation 
of 14 representatives of the congress. Also the 
congress received the right to elect two vice-
chairmen of the State Council (Constitutional 
projects in Russia of XVIII - beginning of XX 
centuries, 2000). 
 
P.A. Valuev proposed to complete the land 
reform with the creation of an all-Russian 
advisory body (congress of state vowels), it is a 
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kind of all-Russian land. However, Alexander II 
rejected this project as untimely. Why did he do 
that? We tend to agree with the opinion of B.G. 
Litvak, who believed that, first of all, Alexander 
II could be afraid for the peasant reform, which 
had just begun to be carried out and in case of 
creation of this representation could be seriously 
"corrected" by the noble majority in its favor, 
which could be in conflict with the national 
interests, cause new unrest of peasants, etc. 
Secondly, Alexander II with the absolute power 
did not want to lose it (Litvak, 1991). 
 
In 1866, the emperor submitted a project by his 
younger brother, grand prince Konstantin 
Nikolaevich, similar to the P.A. Valuev’s one, 
was even more moderate. It was supposed to 
create under the same State Council the land and 
noblemen's congresses with only legislative 
functions (Medushevsky, 2000). There was 
nothing interfered with the implementation of 
this project. The peasant reform was going on for 
the fifth year already and no conservative 
majority of the nobility could turn it back. 
Nevertheless, this project was overtaken by the 
same fate as the previous one. The formal reason 
was the assassination attempt on emperor D. 
Karakozov in April 1866. 
 
In 1874, the project of P.A. Shuvalov appeared 
(with the participation of P.A. Valuyev), which 
was a variation of the two previous projects. It 
was supposed to create a special commission for 
the study of the situation in agriculture from the 
provincial leaders of the nobility and heads of 
provincial land administrations. In fact, it was a 
very moderate procreative project without 
election of deputies, but under certain conditions 
this commission could turn into a people's 
representation in the future (Litvak, 1991). 
Alexander II also rejected this project, sending 
the influential P.A. Shuvalov as an ambassador 
to England. 
 
Finally, in 1880-1881, against the backdrop of 
the terror of the people's wolves, the head of the 
supreme administrative commission, Minister of 
Internal Affairs M.T. Loris-Melikov, developed 
a project called "Loris-Melikov constitution" 
about the creation of two commissions under the 
State Council (financial and administrative) to 
consider the draft laws with only legislative 
functions (deputies were elected from provincial 
lands and city dumas). Then the decisions were 
transferred to the general commission of the State 
Council with 10-15 representatives 
(Medushevsky, 2000). In general, it looked like 
the project of P.A. Valuyev of 1863, but in more 
moderate form. It was not a real constitution, 
although, as in the case of previous projects, it 
could become one of them in the future under 
certain conditions. M.T. Loris-Melikov 
considered it as a minimum concession to public 
opinion and the "spirit of the time" in order to 
deprive revolutionaries of sympathy and support 
for the liberal-minded part of society. A similar 
project was submitted by grand prince 
Konstantin Nikolaevich. This time it seemed that 
Alexander II could be persuaded to make such a 
concession, and he agreed to sign the project, but 
a coincidence of circumstances intervened. On 
March 1, 1881, Alexander II was killed by the 
people's deputies, and Alexander III, who was 
very conservative, refused to do it. In April 1881, 
M.T. Loris-Melikov was retired, and the new 
emperor announced the inviolability of autocracy 
and refused any political reforms. As a result, the 
constitution had to be forgotten, and Russia did 
not become a constitutional monarchy until the 
end of the XIX century. 
 
Conclusion 
 
During the research the authors made a list of 
conclusions. First of all, the process of 
developing constitutional projects in Russia in 
the XIX century rose with sense. It was not the 
only borrowing of constitutional ideas from 
Western countries, but the continuation of the 
development of a restrictive tradition dating from 
the medieval Russia, and in the XVIII century it 
was manifested in the "conditions" of the 
members of the Supreme Privy Council in 1730 
and the projects of N.I. Panin in 1770-1780. 
 
Secondly, under the conditions of absolute 
monarchy in Russia, the elaboration and adoption 
of the constitution could take place either as a 
result of political reform "from above" on the 
initiative of the ruling monarch, or as a result of 
revolution "from below". An attempt to 
implement the second option was the Decembrist 
revolt in 1825, which ended in failure. The first 
option was more likely. At the same time, the 
subjective factor played a huge role: personal 
views, desire to follow the path of progress, 
agreement to limit own power for the sake of the 
future. All these conditions were in place during 
the reign of Alexander I. The emperor was a 
supporter of constitutional ideas. As a result, the 
constitutional projects that had been developed 
before at the private level have moved to the 
highest governmental level and became the basis 
for the policy of governmental constitutionalism, 
which is reflected both in the domestic and 
foreign policy of the country (the Letter of 
Commendation to the Russian people in 1801, of 
the project of M.M. Speransky in 1809, of the 
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Charter Diploma of the Russian Empire in 1818-
1820, the Constitutions of Finland in 1809 and 
the Kingdom of Poland in 1815). The possibility 
of turning Russia into a constitutional monarchy 
under Alexander I was high, but it was not 
realized because of a number of reasons. 
 
Another opportunity was presented during the 
reign of Alexander II. However, the projects of 
P.A. Valuev in 1863, grand prince Konstantin 
Nikolaevich in 1866 and 1880, P.A. Shuvalov in 
1874, M.T. Loris-Melikov in 1880-1881 were 
much more moderate than the projects of the 
beginning of the XIX century. Besides, 
Alexander II did not want to part with the 
autocratic power. 
 
Thirdly, the main reasons for the failure to 
implement the constitutional way of 
development in Russia in the XIX century were 
the special social structure of the society at the 
beginning of the XIX century with the complete 
dominance of the nobility, which in the 
conditions of the need to simultaneously solve 
the issue of serfdom led to a deadlock. In the 
event of the constitution and the establishment of 
the parliament, the nobility majority would 
inevitably block any draft law on peasant issues. 
The narrow social base of the reforms, lack of 
determination and confidence in the rightness of 
Alexander I, the overly active foreign policy, and 
the constant wars that hindered the smooth 
conduct of the reforms were added. Under 
Alexander II, a significant role in the failure of 
constitutional reform was played by the 
emperor's personal views, which were not in any 
way comparable to those of Alexander I and were 
much more moderate in constitutional matters. 
 
The researchers of the reigns of Alexander I and 
Alexander II face the question, about if the 
constitutional alternative in case of successful 
implementation could radically change the 
direction of political development and prevent 
the country from sliding down to the 
revolutionary way of solving the urgent 
problems? In our view, it is impossible to give an 
unambiguous answer, but we can assume that the 
legalization of the forms of political struggle and 
the experience of peaceful discussion of draft 
laws within the framework of parliamentary 
debates could have directed the development of 
Russia towards the gradual folding of elements 
of civil society and the rule of law. On the other 
hand, it is already known what position the first 
members of the Russian parliament could take. 
Therefore, no one could guarantee that the 
constitution for Russia was a progress, and not 
the other way around. 
References 
 
Chartorizhskiy A. (1912). Memoirs of prince A. 
Chartorizhsky and his correspondence with 
Alexander I. Moscow: Book publishing house of 
K.F. Nekrasov. 
Kiseleva E.V. (1995). Alexander I and the 
Restoration of the Bourbons in France. Russia and 
Europe. Diplomacy and culture. 1, 63-78. 
Litvak B.G. (1991). The 1861 coup in Russia: why 
the reformist alternative was not realized. Moscow: 
Politizdat. 
Medushevsky A.N. (1997). Democracy and 
authoritarianism: Russian constitutionalism in a 
comparative perspective. Мoscow: ROSSPEN. 
Medushevsky A.N. (2000). Constitutional projects 
in Russia XVIII - early XX centuries. Moscow: 
Publishing house of Institute of Russian History of 
Russian Academy of Sciences. 
Minaeva N.V. (1982). Government 
constitutionalism and advanced public opinion in 
Russia at the beginning of the 19th century Saratov: 
Publishing house of Saratov University. 
Mironenko S.V. (1989). Autocracy and reform: 
political struggle in Russia at the beginning of the 
19th century. Moscow: Science. 
Okun S.B. (1956). Essays on the history of the 
USSR. The end of XVIII - the first quarter of XIX 
centuries. Leningrad: Uchpedgiz. 
Predtechensky A.V. (1957). Essays on the socio-
political history of Russia in the first quarter of XIX 
century. Moscow: Publishing House of the USSR 
Academy of Sciences. 
Presnyakov A.E. (1924). Alexander I. Leningrad: 
Brockhaus and Efron. 
Pypin A.N. (1900). Social Movement in Russia 
with Alexander I. St. Petersburg: Printing House 
named after M.M. Stasyulevich. 
Safonov M.M. (1988). The problem of reforms in 
government policy of Russia at the turn of XVIII - 
XIX centuries. Leningrad: Science. 
Sakharov A.N. (1998). Alexander I. Moscow: 
Science. 
Schilder N.K. (1904). Emperor Alexander I: his life 
and reign. St. Petersburg: A. S. Suvorin Printing 
House 
Staël G. dе. (2003). Ten years in exile. Moscow: 
United Humanitarian Publishing House. 
Zakharov V.Yu. (2002). "Most gracious Letter of 
Commendation to the Russian people" of 1801 in 
the context of the development of constitutional 
ideas in Russia in the second half of XVIII - early 
XIX centuries. Мoscow: Prometey. 
Zakharov V.Yu. (2011). Constitutionalism as an 
option for the modernization of Russian absolutism 
at the end of the XVIII - first quarter of XIX 
centuries. Russian history. 6, 31-52. 
Zakharov V.Yu. (2017). Russian and foreign 
constitutionalism of late XVIII - first quarter of XIX 
centuries: experience of comparative historical 
analysis. Part 2. Мoscow: Prometey. 
 
